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Abstract—Understanding the properties exhibited by large
scale network probing traffic would improve cyber threat in-
telligence. In addition, the prediction of probing rates is a key
feature for security practitioners in their endeavors for making
better operational decisions and for enhancing their defense
strategy skills. In this work, we study different aspects of the
traffic captured by a /20 network telescope. First, we perform
an exploratory data analysis of the collected probing activities.
The investigation includes probing rates at the port level, services
interesting top network probers and the distribution of probing
rates by geolocation. Second, we extract the network probers
exploration patterns. We model these behaviors using transition
graphs decorated with probabilities of switching from a port
to another. Finally, we assess the capacity of Non-stationary
Autoregressive and Vector Autoregressive models in predicting
port probing rates as a first step towards using more robust
models for better forecasting performance.
Index Terms—Cyber Intelligence, Cyber Security, Network
Telescope, Darknet, Probing Patterns, Transition Graphs, Pre-
diction of Probing Rates, Non-stationary Autoregressive Model,
Non-stationary Vector Autoregressive Model, Machine Learning
I. INTRODUCTION
New cyber threat vectors and vulnerabilities are constantly
emerging with the evolution of technology. Attackers com-
monly scan networks to find vulnerable devices which can be
used for malicious intents. One of the major attacks happened
in 2016 is the Dyn DDoS attack. The attackers used botnets of
vulnerable devices as a primary source of their DDoS traffic
generation, making leading internet platforms unavailable for
a large number of users.
Improving our knowledge on scan activities will help to
prevent cyber attacks through early detection, and in general,
to enhance security policies. Many causes can trigger scan
campaigns such as vulnerability disclosure, worm spread and
zero days. Generally, such malicious traffic is hidden by a
large amount of legitimate traffic, making it complex to be
identified by internet service providers and network security
operators to protect target users.
A passive approach for identifying network probing activi-
ties are network telescopes, also known as darknets. A network
telescope is a sensor logging the traffic received by a set of
passive unallocated network addresses. Therefore, the traffic
received by the network telescope is considered suspicious,
requiring thus to be examined.
To collect such traffic, we use a network telescope hosted
at INRIA Nancy-Grand Est consisting of nearly 4096 IPv4
addresses. By analyzing the collected data, we aim to answer
the following questions:
• What are the most targeted services? What are the ser-
vices targeted by the top network probers?
• How network probers are exploring the target network?
How to model these probing activities?
• Can we predict probing rates of the targeted services?
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The
next section provides a review of the related work to this
study. Section III presents an exploratory analysis of the
darknet traffic. In section IV, we identify the attackers probing
patterns. Finally, in section V, we explore the capacity of Non-
stationary Autoregressive and Vector Autoregressive models to
forecast the probing rates at the port level.
II. RELATED WORK
Reconnaissance is the first phase in the cyber kill chain,
where the attacker scans the target infrastructure looking for
vulnerabilities. A more generic approach for finding vulnerable
devices consists of scanning the whole IPv4 address space,
including network telescopes. Many studies leverage the traffic
captured by the latter to study different aspects of probing
activities. Durumeric et al. [1] studied the traffic acquired by
a large network telescope consisting of 5.5M IP addresses.
The study includes the origin of scans, the targeted services
by network probers and the effect of vulnerability publication
on probing activities. Bou-harb et al. [2] used a probabilistic
and statistical approach to identify the origin of the probing
activities: whether they are generated by scanning tools or
by worms and botnets. They also studied whether probing978-1-5386-7848-0/18/$31.00 c© 2018 IEEE
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activities are random or they exhibit specific patterns. Eto et
al. [3] proposed a method to extract the features of scanning
malwares based on the oscillation of destination IP addresses
in the captured scan packets. Li et al. [4] proposed a general
framework that identifies scanning events and analyzing meth-
ods used by botnets in probing compaigns. They applied their
framework to extract the scanning characteristics of a set of 6
botnets. Papale et al. [5] analyzed a 12-day world-wide cyber
scanning campaign targeting VoIP (SIP) servers caught by a /8
darknet. They found that the origin is the Sality botnet which
generated about 20 million packet from roughly 3 million IP
addresses.
Few studies explored the dependencies between targeted
ports. McNutt and Markus [6] presented a method for detect-
ing the start of anomalous port-specific activity by recognizing
deviation from correlated activities. They found a high cor-
relation between time series of flow counts on unassigned or
obsolete ports that do not have active services. Therefore, they
can detect ports receiving anomalous activities. In contrast to
our work, they used in their study a traffic of an organization
network (not a darknet traffic), where the amount of benign
traffic is large, hiding thus malicious traffic. Lagraa and
Franc¸ois [7] inferred the dependency between services using
graph analysis. They proposed a graph-based model to dis-
cover port scanning behavior patterns. They applied methods
utilized for community structure discovery in large graphs
in order to identify clusters of ports. Our work generalizes
their approach: instead of constructing graphs for each pair of
source and destination IP addresses, our graphs aggregate the
probing activity by source IP address. This approach shows
the general exploration pattern followed by a network prober,
regardless of the target host.
III. EXPLORATORY DATA ANALYSIS
A. Data Set
The data we use is collected by a /20 network telescope.
The traffic was recorded from November 2014 until October
2017 and has a size of 2 TB. The collected traffic consists of
timestamped packet headers. We record for each packet the
source and the destination IP addresses, the source and the
destination ports and the packet’s flags. Our study focuses on
stateful connections established from the source. Hence, we
consider only packets with a TCP SYN flag which count for
approximately 4.5 billion packets.
B. Traffic by Port
We begin by extracting the traffic received by each port.
That is, we aggregate the received traffic by destination port
and we count the number of TCP SYN packets for each
destination port. Figure 1 shows the 30 most targeted ports.
We observe that the most targeted services are remote access
services, web servers, database management systems and some
Microsoft services. The network probers tend to use alternative
ports in addition to the official ones. The port 23 (telnet)
generates more than 50% of the traffic. Figure 2 shows that
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Fig. 1: The 30 most targeted ports and their corresponding
traffic percentage (the length of the bars are in log scale and
the labels above the bars are the actual values)
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Fig. 2: Traffic cumulative percentage by number of ports
among 65535 ports, only 35 generate 80% of the traffic and
550 generate 90% of the traffic.
C. Top Network Probers’ Interests
The intent of a network prober might be manifested in
the services he targets. Knowing the ports that interest the
top network probers determines services requiring particular
security efforts. We consider as a top network prober one
maintaining an average probing rate higher than 150 TCP
SYN packets per day. It is noteworthy that our definition
of top network probers does not include probers performing
distributed probing activities.
First, we count TCP SYN packets sent by more than 64
million source IP addresses included in our data set. Then, for
each top network prober (they are nearly 1500), we extract
the probing rates received by each port and we aggregate the
counts by port. Figure 3 shows the 30 most targeted ports by
top network probers. In contrast to the results in Figure 1, top
network probers focuse their probing activities on the port 22
(SSH) rather than the port 23 (telnet).
D. Traffic by Country
The distribution of the received traffic by geolocation helps
determining how likely an occurred probing campaign is
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Fig. 3: The 30 most targeted ports by top network probers
(the numbers above the bars are the percentages of the traffic
received by ports with respect to the total traffic generated by
the top network probers)
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Fig. 4: Top 30 countries and their corresponding traffic per-
centages
originating from a specific country. We extract the total traffic
caught by the network telescope by country. We infer the
country code from the source IP address using the DB-IP
database1. Figure 4 summarizes the received traffic by country
code.
IV. PROBING PATTERNS
In this section, we model the behavior of network probers
using transition graphs. We assess the relationship between
targeted services by determining the probability of transition
from a port to another, then, we identify different network
exploration patterns.
A. Graph Modeling
A network communication can be identified by a 5-tuple:
source and destination IP addresses, source and destination
ports, and the transport protocol. Our aim is to analyze for
each network prober the exploration behavior of the whole
darknet. Hence, we take into account only two features: the
source IP address and the destination port.
1URL: https://db-ip.com/
To extract the graphs, we begin by aggregating the traffic
generated by each network prober. Then, we count the number
of transitions from a destination port to another by sequentially
browsing the extracted traffic. These counts are finally normal-
ized in order to get the transition probabilities. It is to note
that the time dimension is omitted during this process.
Formally, we extract for each source IP address i a transition
graph Gi(Vi, Ei), in which Vi is the set of destination ports
targeted by the network prober i and Ei represents the transi-
tion probabilities between destination ports that are elements
of Ei. The association between two elements pa and pb of Ei
represents the probability that the network prober i switches
from pa to pb.
B. Extracted Graphs
Figure 5 shows a sample of transition graphs corresponding
to 3 network probers. Figure 5a represents a network prober se-
quentially targeting services typically deployed in web servers:
SSH (22), RDP (3389), MySQL (3306) and FTP (21), while
focusing on the HTTP (80) server. Figure 5b shows a network
prober targeting only the MySQL server port in addition to
two of its alternatives. Figure 5c corresponds to a network
prober targeting remote access services such as SSH (22) and
its alternative (2222), and telnet (23) and its alternative (2323).
Many other probing patterns were identified but they are too
large to fit in this paper.
The extracted transition graphs differ from each other by
two main components: the number of vertices that corresponds
to the destination ports and the number of edges describing the
exploration behavior of a network prober. Figure 6 represents
the cumulative distribution function of the number of target
ports by individual network probers. We observe that more
than 80% of network probers target less than five ports in the
whole darknet space. This means that most attackers are focus-
ing their probing activities only on services of interest, which
might be related to a vulnerability disclosure for example.
C. Relationship Between Ports
In this section, we aim to identify the relationship between
ports in terms of transition probabilities. We begin by aggre-
gating by network prober the number of transitions from a port
to another. Then, normalize these counts by the total number
of transitions. We repeat this process for all network probers
combined together and for top network probers (as defined in
section III-C).
Figure 7 represents the transition matrix of the 30 most
targeted ports in the whole darknet (see section III-B). Unsur-
prisingly, the figure shows a high association between ports
and their alternatives: 23 and 2323, 80 and 8080, and 22 and
2222. The figure also emphasizes a strong relationship between
services of the same type such as MS-SQL SERVER (1433)
and MySQL (3306).
Similarly, Figure 8 shows the transition probabilities of the
30 most targeted ports by top network probers. We observe
fewer relationships compared to the previous transition matrix.
Nevertheless, the SSH and telnet services as well as their
alternatives still strongly related.
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Fig. 5: A sample of transition graphs of 3 network probers.
The size of the vertices corresponds to the number of TCP
SYN packets received by the targeted port.
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Fig. 6: Cumulative distribution of the number of ports targeted
by network probers
V. PREDICTION OF PORT PROBING RATES
Predicting probing activities at the service level is a key fea-
ture for making better security operational decisions. Observ-
ing a significant disparity between the predicted probing rate
and the actual value may help detecting an imminent threat.
In this section, we forecast the probing rate of a target port
by measuring its previous probing rates as well as the traffic
received by the other ports. The predictions are performed
one step ahead of time using the non-stationary autoregres-
sive model (AR) and the non-stationary vector autoregressive
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Fig. 7: Transition matrix of all network probers
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Fig. 8: Transition matrix of top network probers
model (VAR), for each port of the 550 most targeted ports
(see Section III-B), for different time resolutions.
A. Data Set
The probing rate is inferred for different time resolutions:
1 hour, 3 hours, 6 hours, 12 hours and 1 day. For each time
resolution, we extract a data set consisting of the probing rate
time series of the most targeted ports D = {X(i)}i∈[1,550] in
which each record is a vector of probing rates occurring in the
same time interval.
B. Non-stationarity of Probing Rate Time Series and Design
Parameters
The analysis of the port probing rate time series showed
non-stationarity of the first and the second order statistics
over the period of 3 years. However, we observed that when
considering shorter time windows, the non-stationarity tends
to be alleviated at least in terms of average. Therefore, we
introduce a “rolling window” over the probing rate time series.
We train the estimators using the data falling in the rolling
window, then the prediction is performed one step ahead of
time. The size of the rolling window is a design parameter that
could be interpreted as follows: a short rolling window allows
to track the trend in time while larger rolling windows has
the effect of averaging the trend. Another design parameter to
consider is the autoregressive order which allows the model
to infer the linear short term dependencies.
C. Non-stationary AR and VAR Models
To forecast probing rates, we use the non-stationary autore-
gressive model of order p given by:
x(i)(t; p) = w
(i)
0 (t) +
p∑
h=1
w
(i)
h (t)x
(i)(t− h) + (i)(t) (1)
where x(i)(t) is the probing rate received by the ith port
at time t. (i)(t) is the white noise at time t. W (i)t =
(w
(i)
0 (t), w
(i)
1 (t), . . . , w
(i)
p (t)) is the vector of the model pa-
rameters. These parameters are estimated using data falling in
the rolling window (see Section V-B) and they vary in time.
The non-stationary vector autoregressive model of order p
is given by:
x(i)(t; p) = w
(i)
0 (t)+
∑
j∈Ik
p∑
h=1
w
(ij)
h (t)x
(j)(t−h)+(i)(t) (2)
where x(i)(t) is the probing rate received by the ith port (the
target port) at time t, Ik is the set of indexes of the k retained
features (see Section V-F), x(j)(t) is the probing rate on the
jth selected port at time t, and (i)(t) is the white noise at
time t. w(i)0 (t) and {w(ij)h (t)}j∈Ik,h∈[1,p] are the parameters
of the model varying in time.
D. Training Algorithm
After transforming the time series into a supervised learning
problem, the algorithm used to train the non-stationary AR and
VAR regressors is the straightforward normal equation given
by:
W (i) = (XTX)−1XTX(i) (3)
where W (i) is the vector of the trainable weights, X =
(X(j))j∈Ik is the probing rates feature matrix and X
(i) is
the probing rates response vector. In order to reduce the
computation complexity, no regularization is used.
E. Design Parameter Selection
The design parameters, namely the size of the rolling
window N and the autoregressive order p, are determined
using a grid search strategy. We varied p in [1, 10] for the
5 considered time resolutions. Then, we tried an exhaustive
set of rolling window sizes for each autoregressive order p.
The range of N starts with 10 × p time units and ends with
75% of the time series length (leaving thus at least 25% of
data for validation) with an increment of 10 time units. The
optimal design parameter values p? and N? are given by the
estimator providing the best coefficient of determination R2.
F. Feature Selection for the Non-stationary VAR Model
To improve the performance of the non-stationary VAR
estimators, we select features according to their individual
effect on the response variable using the Pearson correlation
coefficient. This process has the effect of reducing the noise
introduced by uncorrelated features. First, we split the data
falling in the rolling window (the one giving the best non-
stationary AR performance) into two subsets: a feature selec-
tion set F including 75% of the data and a validation set V .
Second, we compute on F the univariate correlations in term
of probing rates between the target time series and the time
series serving as features to the non-stationary VAR model,
including the autoregressive features. Third, we iteratively
select the k most correlated features which we use to train non-
stationary VAR model on F and we calculate the coefficient
of determination R2 on the validation set V . The optimal set
of features given by our feature selection strategy is the one
providing the best coefficient of determination. It is worth
mentioning that the selected features may change over time
based on the location of the rolling window in the time series.
Finally, the selected features are scaled to zero mean and to
unit standard deviation.
G. Results and Discussion
Table I summarizes the performance of the non-stationary
AR and VAR models for 5 different time resolutions for a
set of popular services. It also includes the optimal design
parameters for the non-stationary AR estimators. We used the
same design parameters for the non-stationary VAR estimators.
The performance of the regressors tends to increase for
larger time resolutions, for all the ports except the telnet
service. This is due to lowered stochasticity of probing rates
when considering larger time resolutions. Also, we observe
that the probing rates of remote access services are the most
predictable. The reason is that such services are highly targeted
by network probers and their probing rate time series are
stationary when considering short time resolutions.
Also, we observe that the non-stationary AR model pro-
duces satisfying results for services exhibiting low short term
probing rates variability such as telnet (ports 23 and 2323).
Figure 9 shows that non-stationary VAR model consistently
produces better results for services exhibiting high probing
rate variability such as the web services (ports 80 and 443)
and the database management systems (ports 1433 and 3306).
It is noteworthy that the non-stationary autoregressive model
fails in predicting abrupt probing rate changes because of
its persistence property. More powerful and stable models
such as FARIMA+GARCH could be used to predict these
extreme values if the probing rate time series exhibit long-
range dependence phenomenon [8], [9]. Also, such non-
stationary AR and VAR models, as defined in our paper,
require constant update of their parameters (the trainable
weights) and their hyperparameters (the selected features) due
to the non-stationarity of the probing rate time series, which
is computationally expensive.
VI. CONCLUSION
This work presented an exploratory data analysis performed
on 2 TB of traffic collected by a network telescope during the
period of 3 years. The investigation of the network telescope
traffic showed that 90% of probing activities are targeting
only 550 ports of the port space. The latter include remote
access services which are the most sought by network probers,
followed by database management systems, web services and
Network 1 hour 3 hours 6 hours 12 hours 1 day
Service p? N? R2ar R
2
var p
? N? R2ar R
2
var p
? N? R2ar R
2
var p
? N? R2ar R
2
var p
? N? R2ar R
2
var
23 (telnet) 1 17530 0.99 0.99 8 5930 0.98 0.98 4 2880 0.96 0.96 6 1480 0.94 0.94 1 60 0.93 0.93
2323 (telnet alt.) 4 17400 0.99 0.99 2 5760 0.98 0.98 4 2880 0.97 0.97 1 120 0.94 0.94 1 720 0.92 0.92
22 (ssh) 10 19090 0.66 0.71 10 6380 0.81 0.81 9 3190 0.88 0.88 10 1590 0.91 0.91 9 800 0.92 0.92
2222 (ssh alt.) 10 19430 0.56 0.68 10 6390 0.73 0.74 8 3190 0.81 0.81 9 1590 0.86 0.86 6 800 0.88 0.88
445 (microsoft-ds) 10 16080 0.96 0.96 1 160 0.97 0.97 10 2960 0.96 0.96 10 1590 0.96 0.96 8 740 0.96 0.96
80 (http) 10 12890 0.10 0.55 8 550 0.19 0.44 8 2880 0.28 0.61 7 1450 0.34 0.53 7 800 0.44 0.64
443 (https) 6 18870 0.23 0.63 8 6430 0.22 0.69 8 3230 0.31 0.53 10 1610 0.39 0.60 9 800 0.50 0.70
3306 (mysql) 1 700 0.03 0.65 1 250 0.08 0.65 8 2860 0.16 0.40 10 1440 0.29 0.67 8 720 0.40 0.73
1433 (mssql) 1 120 0.39 0.62 1 60 0.61 0.68 9 2940 0.72 0.76 10 1460 0.81 0.81 5 730 0.88 0.88
1883 (mqtt) 1 360 0.03 0.58 9 6000 0.78 0.79 9 3000 0.82 0.82 10 1510 0.84 0.84 7 730 0.82 0.82
TABLE I: Performances of non-stationary AR and VAR estimators for different time resolutions for a set of popular services.
p? and w? are the optimal design parameters for the non-stationary AR estimators.
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Fig. 9: Comparison of performances of the non-stationary AR and VAR models
miscellaneous services as well. This is providing an insight
about services requiring particular security efforts.
The second task was about inferring network probers recon-
naissance patterns. We modeled these exploration behaviors
using transition graphs showing the probabilities of switching
from a port to another. This would be exploited in different
applications such as port clustering or classifying network
probers based on their exploration behaviors.
Finally, we assessed to which extent the non-stationary
autoregressive and vector autoregressive models could produce
reliable short term probing rate predictions at the port level.
Due to their short memory property, such models could
be used to learn non-stationary probing rate processes with
short term persistence. However, when probing rate processes
exhibit long-range dependencies, more robust models could be
utilized such as GRU and LSTM recurrent neural networks.
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